Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorFischer, R.
dc.contributor.authorPalma-Behnke, Rodrigo
dc.contributor.authorGuevara Cedeño, Jessica
dc.date.accessioned2017-07-31T20:29:04Z
dc.date.accessioned2017-07-31T20:29:04Z
dc.date.available2017-07-31T20:29:04Z
dc.date.available2017-07-31T20:29:04Z
dc.date.issued2012-07-01
dc.date.issued2012-07-01
dc.identifier.urihttp://ridda2.utp.ac.pa/handle/123456789/2388
dc.identifier.urihttp://ridda2.utp.ac.pa/handle/123456789/2388
dc.descriptionOne of the main challenges facing the electricity sector worldwide is the design of efficient markets. In particular, the mechanisms used to solve regulatory conflicts are a crucial element of a regulatory regime and a major determinant of the risks borne by private investors. We use the Chilean experience to analyze the evolution of mechanisms for conflict resolution within the electricity sector. We propose a theoretical framework based on bargaining theory to explain the behavior of market agents. This methodological approach is used to explain the evolution of conflict resolution following the introduction of the Experts Panel in 2004, as well as to explain the reduction in the number of conflicts. The results can also be applied to other electricity markets, leading to future market design proposals and governance improvements.en_US
dc.description.abstractOne of the main challenges facing the electricity sector worldwide is the design of efficient markets. In particular, the mechanisms used to solve regulatory conflicts are a crucial element of a regulatory regime and a major determinant of the risks borne by private investors. We use the Chilean experience to analyze the evolution of mechanisms for conflict resolution within the electricity sector. We propose a theoretical framework based on bargaining theory to explain the behavior of market agents. This methodological approach is used to explain the evolution of conflict resolution following the introduction of the Experts Panel in 2004, as well as to explain the reduction in the number of conflicts. The results can also be applied to other electricity markets, leading to future market design proposals and governance improvements.en_US
dc.languageeng
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.rightshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subjectMarket designen_US
dc.subjectconflict resolutionen_US
dc.subjectExperts Panelen_US
dc.subjectbargainingen_US
dc.subjectgame theoryen_US
dc.subjectMarket design
dc.subjectconflict resolution
dc.subjectExperts Panel
dc.subjectbargaining
dc.subjectgame theory
dc.titleConflict Resolution in the Electricity Sector - The Experts Panel of Chileen_US
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record